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A. Introduction

Electricity Deregulations in Japan
Deven Parmar

Japan is currently in the midst of radically reforming its electricity industry. As one

of the very last OECD nations to attempt to deregulate, Japan will complete the

deregulation of electricity retailers by April 2016, thereby allowing competition among

companies that sell electricity to final consumers. Ultimately, Japanese regulators also seek
to deregulate electricity generators in the future as well. An important issue that Japanese
regulators must address is whether they will permit integration between vertical

companies, specifically, vertically integration between: (1) generation companies that

produce electricity, (2) retailer companies that sell electricity to final consumers, and (3)
transmission companies that enable the transport of electricity between generators and
retailers.

This paper studies the unique way that Japan’s proposed deregulation strategy

allows for some vertical integration between retail and transmission. Their approach

diverges from other countries that only allow vertical integration between generation and

retail as in UK, or only allow vertical integration between generation and transmission as in
Germany. The paper provides a theoretical basis for these different vertical arrangements
and predicts their impact on competition. That is, do we believe that vertical integration

will likely benefit or harm consumers as deregulation proceeds and does this differ across
the various types of vertical integration mentioned. To do this, I model these three
scenarios to provide an analysis of whether Japan’s vertical integration between

transmission and retail is theoretically sound. The results show that prior to competitive
entry, Japan’s vertical integration strategy performs worst for final consumers compared

with the alternate approaches, however, after competitive entry, Japan’s vertical

integration strategy performs the best. This said, Japan’s vertical integration strategy
creates asymmetry between retailers that could raise other potential anticompetitive
concerns.

B. Background
All electricity industries are made up of three distinct markets. First, power

generators create electricity and operate on the upstream. This market is characterized by
high fixed costs and relatively low marginal costs. Although initially state-owned, this
market tends to face the most change from competition because generators compete

almost exclusively on price with no differentiation across competitors. The retail market
operates on the downstream. These companies market and sell electricity to final

consumers such as households and industries. Unlike generation, these retail companies
face positive variable costs associated with marketing and advertising. Further, product

differentiation is possible among retailers such that these companies may compete beyond
just price competition. For example, improved quality, speed, and efficiency can allow

retailers to distinguish themselves and establish some market power. Finally, the third

market is transmission. Here, transmission companies provide the infrastructure for
generators to transport their electricity to consumers through cable wiring. What is

important is that transmission services are an input for generators in order for them to
have access to consumers. 1 Universally, transmission is treated as a natural monopoly

because infrastructure is costly to install for both producers and consumers so that it
Electricity Transmission A Primer, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON ELECTRICITY POLICY, 23, 2004, available at
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/primer.pdf (Apr. 29, 2016)
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would be inefficient to have competing infrastructure. 2 Further, transmission companies

face the complex problem of managing the movement of electricity from generators to

consumers in real time because storing electricity is not possible. 3 Because of this, even

with privatization, transmission companies operate as monopolies and tend to be highly

regulated. Regulators ensure that prices are not too high and that pricing is

nondiscriminatory to prevent transmission companies from giving unfair advantage to
some generators.

C. Why Deregulate
Through the mid-1970 onwards, most OECD countries faced a wave of deregulation

across industries ranging from telecommunication and transport to banking. 4 Electricity

market deregulations, however, markedly lagged other industries with efforts occurring in
the late 1990s and early 2000s. 5 The US and Germany commenced their deregulation in

1998, and the UK stands as a pioneer being the first country to start deregulating their

electricity industry in 1990. In contrast, Japan is late to engage in reform. Japan is part of a
small minority of OECD countries that has not completed deregulation of the retail

electricity market and has not even started deregulation of the generation market. 6

Interestingly, Japan faces relatively expensive retail electricity prices at about 26 US

cents/kWh, which is higher than the average US prices of 12 cents/kWh and UK prices at
22 US cents/kWh, but still lower than German prices at 35 US cents/kWh. 7

Al-Sunaidy, A., Green, R., Electricity deregulation in OECD countries. ENERGY 31 (2006) 769, 770.
Id. at 8.
4 Kwoka, John E., Twenty-Five Years of Deregulation: Lessons for Electric Power, 33 LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO
LAW JOURNAL 885, 885 (2002).
5 Al-Sunaidy at 782 (Table 3).
6 Id.
7 Average electricity prices around the world: $/kWh, Ovo Energy.
https://www.ovoenergy.com/guides/energy-guides/average-electricity-prices-kwh.html (Apr. 29, 2016)
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Traditionally, the electricity market was treated as a quintessential case of a natural

monopoly worthy of government regulation. Characterized by high fixed costs, close to

zero marginal costs, and large economies of scale, power generation appeared to operate

most efficiently when supplied by a single provider. 8 Further, transmitting power from the

generators to consumers through power cables required installing extensive infrastructure
as a public good. As a result, these state-owned monopolies were usually vertically

integrated to control both the generation of energy as well as the transmission and retail of

energy to the final consumer. 9 These large corporations were believed to be beneficial

because they could operate most efficiently at the lowest average cost. To counteract the

anticompetitive pricing tendencies of these monopolists, regulators typically imposed “rate
of return” pricing that tied the sales price of electricity to a fixed rate of return on
investment. 10

A few realizations drove the wave of deregulation across OECD countries in the

1990s. First, improvements in electricity generation technology reduced costs and created

the possibility that multiple firms could profitably operate in a sufficiently large market.

However, in the face of these improving technologies, electricity prices still continued to

rise, creating pressure to deregulate. These higher prices were attributed to inefficiencies

driven by perverse incentives. Specifically, rate of return pricing perversely incentivized

companies to artificially raise costs. By inflating costs through inefficient operations,

regulated companies could raise their cost of capital and demand higher regulated prices.
8 See Coulson, Edward N., The Effect of Electricity Deregulation on State Economies, Pennsylvania State
University. 1 http://grizzly.la.psu.edu/~ecoulson/electric_apr05.pdf (2005).
9 Klitgaard, Thomas and Rekha Reddy, Lowering Electricity Prices through Deregulation, 6 CURRENT ISSUES IN
ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 14, 1 (2000).
10 Al-Sunaidy at 776.
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Ultimately, the effect of deregulation on prices is mixed. Certainly cases exist, such

as the failed deregulation of California’s electricity market, where haphazard deregulation

increased market power for incumbents resulting in higher unregulated supracompetitive
prices. 11 However, studies attempting to measure the impact of deregulation across US

states have found that deregulated states have lower electricity prices on average,
particularly for residential consumers. 12 The UK stands as a success story where

deregulation of both the generation industry in 1990 and retail industry in 1998 lead to
entry and ultimately a 30% reduction in retail prices by 2002. 13 Further, looking at the

extent of customer switching from incumbent retailers to other competitors retailers, the
UK generally performed well with a 30%–50% switching rate. 14 Although the UK

regulators initially required complete vertical separation of generation, transmission, and

retail, by 1998, regulators allowed vertical integration between generators and retailers,
but not transmission companies. 15

At the other spectrum, German electricity deregulation was less smooth. Here,

instead of complete ownership separation between generation, transmission, and retail,
Germany allowed generators and transmission companies to integrate under common

ownership. 16 In order to prevent transmission companies from charging higher prices to
rival generators, regulators required nondiscriminatory prices so that all generators,

11 See Borenstein, Soren (2002). "The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding California's
Restructuring Disaster," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16, 191-211.
12 Coulson, at 14–15.
13 Analysis of DTI “Quarterly Energy Prices “ Table 2.2.1 2
http://www.dti.gov.uk/energy/inform/energy_prices/tables.sht ml
14 Al-Sunaidy at 782 (Table 3).
15 Steve Thomas, Regulation in a deregulated energy market: British experience. PSIRU University of
Greenwich. 3(2002).
16 Id. at 777–78.
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including those owned by transmission companies, were charged the same rate. 17

However, the results indicate that an increase in competition was not obvious in Germany.

Instead of more market players, liberalization resulted in greater concentration. Originally,
the eight major companies accounting for 79% of the generation market shrunk to four

companies accounting for 96% of the market seven years after liberalization. 18 Similarly

for retail, five companies accounting for 59% of the retail market shrunk to four companies
accounting for 72.8% of the market. 19 Looking to electricity prices, the six years after

liberalization has not seen a sustained reduction but rather just a stagnation of retails
prices. 20 Finally, as expected, estimates on customer switching rate from incumbent

retailers to competitors is only at 5%-10%. 21
D. Japanese Electricity Deregulation

The Japanese situation has faced a similar general history. Originally established as

a state-run entity, Japan privatized its energy market by forming ten regulated regional

monopolies, each with ownership over power generation, cable transmission, and retailing
energy to consumers. 22 Here, regulators set prices to allow these firms to earn about a 3%

rate of return. 23 Japan’s initial efforts at deregulation also arose under a similar concern of

inefficiencies and pressures to reduce costs and prices. Among OECD countries, Japan has
the eighth most expensive retail prices for households largely attributed to cost inflation.

Id. at 779.
Brandt, Torsten, Liberalization, privatization and regulation in the German electricity sector, 5 Wirtschaftsund Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI) in der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. (2006).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 16.
21 Al-Sunaidy at 782 (Table 3).
22 Utilities have a Monopoly on Power. The Japan Times available at
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2011/09/06/news/utilities-have-monopoly-on-power/#.Vx7LhBjGJbU
(Apr. 29, 2016).
23 Id.
17
18
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For example, TEPCO’s expenditure of ¥11.6 billion (approximately $109 million) on

advertising was criticized because as a monopolist, such expenditures on advertising was
unnecessary. 24 Most recently, Japan’s electricity markets faced severe constraints

following the Fukushima earthquake disaster that caused a crisis at Japanese nuclear

plants. The subsequent shutdown of all nuclear plants, most of which are still closed today,
eliminated 30% of Japan’s power source leading to volatile electricity shortages and

electricity bills rising much as 40%. 25 Finally, Japan’s increasing reliance on imports to

meets its energy needs has left it with an energy self-sufficiency rate at only 6%, the second
lowest among OECD countries. 26 This concern over energy security has further pressured

Japan’s agencies to look to market mechanisms to improve energy efficiency. 27

Nevertheless, Japan’s deregulation process has been markedly gradual and

incomplete. First, unlike retail deregulation among other OECD countries that have taken

between one to nine years to complete, Japan’s deregulation of retail began in 2000 and is

set to finish sixteen years later by April 2016. Further, although entry into these previously
closed markets has opened up for some 60% of the retail market, regulated price caps will

not be removed until April 2020. 28 This gradual approach is influenced by a reaction to the

British and Californian experience of large price spikes and volatility closely following

Id.
Notes from meeting with the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry on Electricity Market Reform in
Japan on March 22nd 2016.
26 Notes from meeting with the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry on Electricity Market Reform in
Japan on March 22nd 2016.
27 Energy deregulation threatens to break up Japanese monopolies. The Financial Times. March 29, 2015
available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ac713e7a-cbd1-11e4-beca00144feab7de.html#axzz467AnmGHK (Apr. 29, 2016)
28 Notes from meeting with the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry on Electricity Market Reform in
Japan on March 22nd 2016.
24
25
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deregulation. 29 Second, Japan is unique in deciding to complete deregulation of the retail

electricity market first, before commencing deregulation of the power generation market.

Neither the UK, the US, nor Germany adopted this approach believing that energy
inefficiencies primarily occurs in the generation market.

In terms of the specific deregulatory policy, there are two characteristics that make

Japan’s deregulation particularly novel: (1) greater product differentiation at the retail

market, and (2) vertical integration allowed between retail and transmission. Typically,
electricity markets operate completely independent from other utilities. However,

Japanese regulators have made a concerted effort to attract a diverse array of potential
entrants from other industries to enter the retail market. 30 Specifically, Japanese

regulators have registered potential retail entrants across numerous other industries

including: five companies operating in gas and oil, five companies operating in renewables,
four companies operating in telecommunication and broadcast, and companies operating
in other utilities such as railway. 31 The strategy is that these companies will bundle

electricity services with other services such as heating, gas, or telecommunications to sell
to final consumers. By doing so, product differentiation is now possible as firms not only
compete on price, but can provide a unique bundle of products that compete on quality.

29 Notes from meeting with the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry on Electricity Market Reform in
Japan on March 22nd 2016.
30 Notes from meeting with the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry on Electricity Market Reform in
Japan on March 22nd 2016; Ito, Koichiro., Deregulation of Japan’s Electricity Market: Key Factors Needed for
Success. Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago. March 1, 2016 available at
https://epic.uchicago.edu/news-events/news/deregulation-japan%E2%80%99s-electricity-market-keyfactors-needed-success.
31 Notes from meeting with the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry on Electricity Market Reform in
Japan on March 22nd 2016.
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This approach attempts to address concerns that the low marginal cost of electricity may
results in unsustainably low electricity margins for retailers that hinder entry.

Japan’s second major difference is the way it seeks to separate generation,

transmission, and retail. Originally, generation, transmission, and retail operations were all
vertically integrated and divided into regional monopolies. With the commencement of

retail liberalization in 2000, entry came from both generators seeking vertical integration
and new entrants from other industries. However, by 2020, regulators will require that

generation be completely independent, such that a company that generates electricity can

have no ownership rights of any transmission or retail company. The separation between

generation and retail is justified given the concern that a generator with market power can
engage in exclusionary conduct by discriminating across rival retailers. Conversely, the
separation between generation and transmission is justified by the concern that

transmission companies, which operates as a natural monopoly, may discriminate among
competing generators once this market opens up. However, vertical integration between

transmission and retailers will be allowed in Japan. 32 In doing so, Japanese regulators still

require “legal unbundling” whereby transmission departments are prohibited from

discriminatory pricing or treatment across any of the generators that they sell to. But since

transmission companies do not sell directly to retailers and only impact retailers’ prices via
generators, this may alleviate concerns of discriminatory exclusion vis-à-vis retailers.

Japan’s arrangement differs from the British and German approach as illustrated in

Figure A. Recall that although the UK initially required disintegration across all three

Notes from meeting with the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry on Electricity Market Reform in
Japan on March 22nd 2016.
32
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markets, they eventually allowed integration between generators and retailers. Beyond

possible efficiencies, one benefit for consumers is the elimination of a double margin from a

merged generator and retailer entity because generators sell electricity directly to retailers.

Similarly, vertical integration between transmission companies and generators, as found in
Germany, may also benefits from eliminating double margins. This benefit of eliminating
double margins may not exist in Japan’s transmission-retail integration because

transmission companies sells directly to generators and only impacts retailers’ behavior
via generators.

The next section shall discuss the theoretical implications of the various vertical

integration arrangements between Japan, the UK, and Germany. By taking into account

product differentiation at the retail level in the Japanese market, the theory shall predict
price effects under the various vertical arrangements.
E. Theory

In analyzing Japan’s model, I make three simplifying assumptions. First, regulatory

enforcement is perfect such that regulations that prohibit discriminatory pricing operate

perfectly. Second, I assume there are no countervailing efficiencies to vertical integration

beyond the elimination of double margins. Although regulators may operate imperfectly or
countervailing efficiencies may exist, I ignore these because I am interested in the prima

facie expectation of these vertical arrangements. Third, for simplicity, I assume there are

no price-cap regulations before and after competitive entry. Although Japanese regulators

will likely continue to limit transmission prices after deregulation, estimating prices effects
without price regulation informs the pricing incentives of these companies. Seven models
are analyzed consisting of: a status quo benchmark model with full integration and no
10

competition, the three UK, German, and Japanese vertical arrangements prior to

competitive entry, and then three UK, German, and Japanese vertical arrangement after

competitive entry. Figure A and B presents an illustration of the six models and Appendix A
presents the analytical model.

00. Status Quo No Deregulation (Full Integration and No Competition)

This is the status quo pre-deregulation scenario where one vertically integrated firm

dominates the entire industry. It is not necessarily clear that this scenario is bad because
the benefits of eliminating double or triple margins create efficiencies despite monopoly

pricing. To account for cost inflations that exist in closed markets, I apply an inefficiency
factor where costs under “No Competition” scenarios are x times the costs under

competitive entry scenarios. There is no loss of generality in applying this factor.
A1. Generation-Retail Integration, No Competition (UK Model, pre-entry)

Because a generators-retailers entity is now separated from the transmission

companies, the imposition of two margins on the retail price should raise prices compared
with “00 Status Quo”. A cost-inflation factor is applied to this scenario.

A2. Transmission-Generation Integration, No Competition (German Model, pre-entry)
Because a transmission-generation entity is now separated from retailers, the

imposition of two margins on the retail price should raise prices compared with “00 Status
Quo”. A cost-inflation factor is applied to this scenario.

A3. Transmission-Retail Integration, No Competition (Japan Model, pre-entry)

Because a transmission-generation entity is now separated from retailers, the

imposition of multiple margins on the retail price should raise prices. However, since a

monopolistic generator may pass on some of the high transmission prices down to the
11

retailer, transmission companies may have an incentive to lower their prices. The net
effect compared to “00 Status Quo” is ambiguous. A cost-inflation factor is applied.
B1. Generation-Retail Integration, Full Competition (UK Model, post-entry)

A generator engaged in perfect competition with others integrates with one of the

retailers. With competitive entry, competition among generators should push prices down
to marginal cost. But since retailers are able to differentiate themselves by bundling their

electricity services with other utilities, they should be able to maintain some

supracompetitive retail price. This dynamic is modeled as a Bertrand product

differentiation duopoly game between two retailers. 33 Finally, the transmission

monopolist still charges monopoly prices. Overall, it is not clear whether integration
creates any benefits since margins for generators are already at zero.

B2. Transmission-Generation Integration, Full Competition (German Model, post-entry)
A generator engaged in perfect competition with others integrates with the

transmission monopolist. With competitive entry, competition among generators should
push generation prices down to marginal cost, while the transmission company can still
prices as a monopolist. Retailers price supracompetitively under a Bertrand product

differentiation duopoly game.

B3. Transmission-Generation Integration, Full Competition (Japan Model, post-entry)
One of the retailers competing in Bertrand duopoly integrated with the transmission

monopolist. Bertrand competition at the retail market should drive prices down though

33 Bertrand product differentiation models are a standard tools used to model mergers in antitrust. The
model assumes that retailers are engaged in price (rather than quantity) competition and allows for some
product differentiation so that a price increase on one retailer will lead some, but not all, consumers to switch
to a competitor.
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prices should remain above marginal cost. Further, even if the transmission company

operates as a monopoly, the impact of the transmission company’s prices on retail, via
pass-through from generators, should further place a downward pressure on price.
Figure A – Vertical Integration without Competition

UK Model, pre-entry

German Model, pre-entry

Japanese Model, pre-entry

Transmission & Retail
– Monopoly

Transmission – Monopoly
Transmission & Generation
– Monopoly

Generation– Monopoly
Generation & Retail
– Monopoly
Retail– Monopoly

Figure B – Vertical Integration with Competition
UK Model, postentry

German Model, post-entry

Japanese Model, post-entry

Transmission & Retail

Transmission – Monopoly
Transmission & Generation

Generation
– Perfect Competition

Retail
–Differentiated Products

Generation
– Perfect Competition

Retail
–Differentiated Products

F. Analysis
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Generation
– Perfect Competition

Retail
–Differentiated Products

Profit maximization models are calculated for each of the seven scenarios above. The

model assumes linear demand of the form Q = 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽. For the Bertrand product

differentiation duopoly model, the two retailers’ demand functions are
𝑞𝑞1 =

𝛼𝛼

−
2

3

𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 and 𝑞𝑞2 =
2

𝛼𝛼

−
2

3
2

𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 such that 𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑞𝑞2 = Q when 𝑝𝑝1 = 𝑝𝑝2 =

𝑃𝑃. Retailers #1 and #2 face marginal costs respectively 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 and 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 and generators face

marginal cost 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 . Finally, these costs are subject to an 𝑥𝑥 factor increase in the pre-entry
models A1-A3. Profit maximizing equilibria are calculated for each entity in the model.

This is done by first deriving the first order condition for each profit maximizing entity and
then solving for the equilibrium retail price. Appendix A presents the profit maximizing

functions and the derived formula for equilibrium retails prices. From here, equilibrium
quantity, consumer, and producer surplus can be easily calculated.

To illustrate the competitive effects, an example where 𝛼𝛼 = 100, 𝛽𝛽 = 1, 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 =

𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 =5 and 𝑥𝑥 = 4 is calculated. Figure C and D show the price and surplus effects for each

scenario normalized to the base case of “00 Status Quo”. The direction of the price effects

relative to the base case is general such that it does not depend on the magnitude of 𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽, c,
or x as proven in Appendix A.
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Price Effect as % of Status Quo (Vertically Inegrated
Monopoly)

Figure C: Estimated Average Retail Price Effect
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

A1: UK Model

A2: German
Model

A3: Japanese
Model

Without Entry

B1: UK Model

B2: German
Model
With Entry

Figure D: Estimated Consumer and Producer Surplus Effects
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B3: Japanese
Model
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Figure C and D presents some interesting results. First, compared to the status quo of a

fully vertically integrated monopoly, all three models show that vertical disintegration

without competitive entry worsens price and surplus due to the imposition of multiple

margins that disintegration creates. However, once entry is allowed such that generation

becomes perfectly competitive and retail competes with product differentiation, then both
price and surplus improve as expected.

What makes the analysis interesting is the asymmetry between the Japanese Model

(allowing integration between transmission and retail) and the UK (allowing integration
between generation and retail) and German Model (allowing integration between

transmission and generation). Here we see that without competitive entry, the Japanese
model performs worse than the UK and German Model with higher prices and lower
surpluses. This is driven by the fact that integrating retailer and generators (UK) or
16

transmission companies with generators (Germany) has the benefit of removing double
margins. This benefit does not exist when integrating transmission and retail because

transmission companies do not sell to retailers directly. As a result, any lower price that

transmission companies sells to generators has a less than 100% pass-through benefit to
retailers.

This said, when the generation and retail markets are liberalized to allow entry,

then we see a reversal. Now, the Japanese model outperforms the UK and German model
with lower prices and higher surpluses. This is because competition in the generation

market eliminates their market power, driving prices to marginal cost. As a result, there

are no benefits from eliminating double margins because generation margins are already
zero. But the Japanese model has the added benefit that vertical integration between
transmission and retail creates an incentive for the transmission-retailer to use its

monopoly profit in transmission to subsidize its retail prices. The transmission-retailer

entity can profitably maintain a high price of transmission as a costs imposed to generators
and ultimately on all retailers including rival retailers. However, at the same time, the

transmission-retailer entity can also use its transmission monopoly rents to subsidize the

price of its own retailer. In doing so, the integrated entity can expand market share in the
retail market to recoup the losses from the subsidization. Note that this result still

maintains the nondiscriminatory transmission price that is constantly applied across all
generators as required by Japanese regulation.

Ultimately, the net effect of competition of the Japanese model is still ambiguous.

Although consumers benefit from the lower prices that transmission subsidizes, this
creates an asymmetrical advantage for the integrated retailer over its rivals. If this
17

advantage is maintained, the transmission-retail integrated entity could capture sufficient
market share to exercise market power. This could lead to a return to concentrated

markets and cost inflation that occurred in Germany. Take Figure E, which shows the trend
of average retail prices as the rival retailer becomes more efficient relative to the

transmission-retailer entity. In the situation of no integration at all, prices steadily fall as

the rival firm becomes more efficient and gains market share. This is because a rival’s cost
advantage pressures all retailers to lower prices to compete. However, when there is

transmission-retailer integration, average prices fails to fall as fast in reaction to lower rival
costs. This can indicate a reduction in competitive pressure and inefficiency in the market.
Similarly, Figure F shows the increase in the market share of a more efficient rival as the
more efficient rival lowers its costs. Although the rival’s market share increases with

efficiency, the transmission-retailer firm is able to maintain a significant market share

advantage in the face of the rival’s increasing efficiency. If product differentiation is strong
enough, this could lead to a result where more efficient retailers are hindered or even

excluded from the market due to the subsidies that the transmission entity provides to

their retailer.

Figure E: Average Retail Price as Rival Cost Efficiency Improves
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Figure F: Rival’s Market Share as Rival Cost Efficiency Improves
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G. Conclusion
These unique results are driven by the interaction between transmission-retailer

integration and product differentiation at the retail market. Japanese regulators have a
sound understanding of each of these effects independently. Transmission-retailer

integration on its own is beneficial as it creates incentives to lower retail prices with no

price discrimination. Further, product differentiation grants retailers some market power
to induce diverse entry and allows for quality competition, rather than pure price

competition. But when these two dynamics interact, the overall competitive effect is more
complex and ambiguous.

From a consumer perspective, prices are lower and both producer and consumer

surplus are higher under the Japanese Model. However, these lower prices come with a
dominant retailer that may have sufficient market power to hinder entry and increase
concentration. Modern economic theory rejects predatory pricing as anticompetitive
20

because a dominant firm could not profitably drive out rivals through below-cost pricing

and expect to recoup. However, this situation is different because the transmission-retailer
can subsidize retail prices above costs to expand their retail market share in a way that is
profitable. 34 What is important is that this type of vertical integration, even with

aggressive regulation, forces the integrated entity to take account of the effect of its

transmission prices its own retail sales. This said, a possible counterargument is that the
transmission-retailer advantage is needed to counteract the market power that diverse
rivals exercise when they bundles electricity services with others utilities. These rivals

could use the market power in their other utilities markets to subsidize electricity retail
prices similar to what the transmission-retailer does.

Ultimately, this paper is unable to provide a conclusive result on the competitive impact

of Japan’s model because there are crosscutting effects that depend on antitrust goals and

empirical facts. Rather, this paper raises some unique issues that have not been addressed
in prior deregulations efforts and are not necessarily obvious to Japanese regulators.

Nevertheless, there is one clear policy implication. Recall that the Japanese model

performs worse than the UK and German model under closed markets, but performs better
than the UK and German model once competition opens up. This makes Japan’s slow and
gradual deregulation process problematic. Retail market liberalization took sixteen to

complete, vertical integration regulation will not be imposed until 2020, and only

afterwards shall deregulating the generation market commence. This delay is likely to be
harmful because Japan’s model is especially harmful to consumers without competition.

The simulation in Figure D predicts that the transmission-retailer entity has 14% high profits with vertical
integration than without.
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The benefits of vertical integration only accrue after competition opens up and entry is

allowed. Such gradualism may also exacerbate the asymmetric effects that transmission-

retail integration creates in the retail market. As a result, Japanese regulators should seek
faster reforms that open up competition earlier. From discussion with the regulators, it is
likely that the hesitance to deregulate generation is more of a political problem due to

entrenched interests, rather than a purposeful strategy. Nevertheless, with an established

commitment to deregulate generation, sooner is better than later.
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Appendix A
This appendix presents the theoretical analysis for the seven models presented in
the paper. Each model assumes the same linear demand function for retail electricity of
form Q = 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽, applies the relevant vertical integration and competition structure, and
then calculates the profit maximizing equilibria for each participant. For each model, this
appendix will: (a) identify the participants and the type of vertical integration, (b) present
the profit maximization problem for each participant, (c) present the first-order conditions
for each participant, (d) solve for the equilibrium retail price.
Assumed Inputs
𝛼𝛼
x-intercept of the linear demand function when 𝑃𝑃 = 0
𝛽𝛽
Slope of the linear demand function as 𝑃𝑃 increases
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔
Marginal cost of generators
𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟
Marginal cost of retailers
𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1
Marginal cost of retailer #1
𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2
Marginal cost of retailer #2
𝑥𝑥
Cost-inflation factor that applied to all costs with no-competition
Calculated Variables
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
Profit function of an independent transmission company
𝜋𝜋𝑔𝑔
Profit function of an independent generator
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟
Profit function of an independent retailer
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟1
Profit function of an independent retailer #1
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟2
Profit function of an independent retailer #2
𝜋𝜋𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
Profit function of a generator-retailer integrated company
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
Profit function of a transmission-generator integrated company
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
Profit function of a transmission-retailer integrated company
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
Profit function of a transmission-generator-retailer integrated company
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
Price that an independent transmission company sells.
𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔
Price that an independent generator sells.
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟
Price that an independent retailer.
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1
Price that an independent retailer #1 sells.
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2
Price that an independent retailer #2 sells.

Scenario 00: Status Quo of Full Integration and No Competition
This scenario involves one vertically integrated profit-maximizing firm that assumes all
generation and retailing costs and sells directly to the final consumer. The firm’s profit
function is:
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 ) − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 ) − 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 )
The firm is a monopolist, so it sets 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 such that:
𝛼𝛼 − 2𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔 𝛽𝛽 + 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 𝛽𝛽 = 0
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The equilibrium retail price is:

𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟∗ =

𝛼𝛼 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟
+
+
2𝛽𝛽
2
2

Scenario A1: Generation-Retailer Integration, No Competition
This scenario involves two entities. A transmission monopolist that sells transmission
services to a vertically integrated generator-retailer monopolist that sells directly to the
final consumer. The profit functions of the two entities are:
𝜋𝜋𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 �𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 � − 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 ) − 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 )
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 �𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 �
The respective first order conditions are:
𝛼𝛼 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 =
+
+
+
2𝛽𝛽
2
2
2
𝛼𝛼 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =
−
−
2𝛽𝛽
2
2
The equilibrium retail price is:

𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟∗ =

3𝛼𝛼 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟
+
+
4𝛽𝛽
4
4

Scenario A2: Transmission-Generation Integration, No Competition
This scenario involves two entities. A vertically integrated transmission-generation
monopolist that sells transmission services to a retailer monopolist that sells directly to the
final consumer. The profit functions of the two entities are:
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 ) − 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 )
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 ) − 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 )
The respective first order conditions are:

𝛼𝛼 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔
+
+
2𝛽𝛽
2
2
𝛼𝛼 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟
𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 =
+
−
2𝛽𝛽
2
2
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 =

The equilibrium retail price is:

𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟∗ =

3𝛼𝛼 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟
+
+
4𝛽𝛽
4
4

Scenario A3: Transmission-Retail Integration, No Competition
This scenario involves two entities, a vertically integrated transmission-retail monopolist
and a generator monopolist. Here, the transmission-retailer monopolist both sells
transmission services to the generator monopolist but also purchases power from the
generator that they sell directly to the final consumer. As a result, the transmission-retailer
monopolist maximizes profits by setting two prices, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 and 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 . The profit functions of the
two entities are:
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𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 ) − 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 ) + 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 )
𝜋𝜋𝑔𝑔 = 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 ) − 𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 )

The transmission-retailer’s first order condition when setting the retail price, 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 is:
𝛼𝛼 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 𝛽𝛽 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 =
+
+
2𝛽𝛽
2
2

The generator’s sets its price, taking the transmission-retailer’s first order condition as
given, such that:
𝛼𝛼 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 =
+
−
+
2𝛽𝛽
2
2
2

The transmission-retailer maximizes profit by setting 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 taking the 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 and 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 functions as
given such that:
𝛼𝛼 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =
−
−
3𝛽𝛽
3
3
Solving for the equilibrium retail price gives:
5𝛼𝛼 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟∗ =
+
+
6
6
6𝛽𝛽

Scenario B1: Generation-Retailer Integration, With Competition
This scenario involves a transmission company monopolist, multiple generators engaged in
perfect competition, and two retailers engaged in Betrand product differentiation
competition. However, one of the generators competing perfectly is vertically integrated
with one of the retailers. Thus, this scenario models the profit maximizing behavior of
three entities: the transmission company monopolist, retailer #1 that is integrated with a
generator, and retailer #2 that operates independently and competes with retailer #1. The
𝛼𝛼
3
demand equations for retailer #1 and #2 respectively are 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 = 2 − 2 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 and
𝛼𝛼

3

1

1

𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 = 2 − 2 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 so that 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 = 𝛼𝛼 − 2 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟1 − 2 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 = 𝑄𝑄 when 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 .
The profit function for the transmission company monopolist:
1
1
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 )
2
2

Profit function for the retailer #1 integrated with a generator.
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) + 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) + 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 )
− 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 )
Retailer #2’s profit function is:
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟2 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 )

All generators operate in perfect competition such that:
𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 = 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 + 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
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Retailer #1’s profit function simplifies to:
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 )
Retailer #2’s profit function simplifies to:
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟2 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 )
The reaction functions for the two retailers are:
𝛼𝛼 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 =
+ +
+
+
6𝛽𝛽 2
2
3
𝛼𝛼 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 =
+ +
+
+
6𝛽𝛽 2
2
3

𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
2
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
2

The retailers’ first order conditions with respect to 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 are:
𝛼𝛼
9𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 3𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 3𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 3𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
+
+
+
+
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 =
4𝛽𝛽
16
16
4
4
3𝑐𝑐
𝛼𝛼
9𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 3𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1
3𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑔𝑔
+
+
+
+
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 =
4𝛽𝛽
16
16
4
4

The transmission company’s first order conditions taking the retailers’ reaction functions
as given is:
𝛼𝛼 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =
+
+
+
2𝛽𝛽
4
4
2
Solving for the equilibrium retail price is:
5𝛼𝛼 3𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 3𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔
∗
=
+
+
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1
8𝛽𝛽
8
8
3𝑐𝑐
5𝛼𝛼
3𝑐𝑐
𝑔𝑔
𝑟𝑟2
∗
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2
=
+
+
8
8
8𝛽𝛽

Scenario B2: Transmission-Generation Integration, With Competition
This scenario involves a transmission company monopolist that is integrated with a
generator engaged in perfect competition. The generators sell electricity to two retailers
engaged in Betrand product differentiation competition. The demand equations for retailer
𝛼𝛼
3
𝛼𝛼
3
#1 and #2 respectively are 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 = 2 − 2 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 and 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 = 2 − 2 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 so that
1

1

𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 = 𝛼𝛼 − 2 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟1 − 2 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 = 𝑄𝑄 when 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 .
The profit function for the transmission-generator company is:
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) + 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 )
The profit function for two retailers, #1 and #2, are:
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 )
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟2 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 )
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Since all generators operate in perfect competition such that 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 = 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 + 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 , the retailers’
profits functions simplify to:
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 )
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟2 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 )
The reaction functions for the two retailers are:
𝛼𝛼 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
+ +
+
+
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 =
6𝛽𝛽 2
2
3
2
𝛼𝛼 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 =
+ +
+
+
6𝛽𝛽 2
2
3
2
T
he retailers’ first order conditions with respect to 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 and 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 are:
𝛼𝛼
9𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 3𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 3𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 3𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
+
+
+
+
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 =
4𝛽𝛽
16
16
4
4
𝛼𝛼
9𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 3𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 3𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 3𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
+
+
+
+
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 =
4𝛽𝛽
16
16
4
4

The transmission company maximizes profit taking the retailers’ reaction functions so that:
𝛼𝛼 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =
+
+
+
4
4
2
2𝛽𝛽
Solving for the equilibrium retail price is:
5𝛼𝛼 3𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 3𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔
∗
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1
=
+
+
8
8
8𝛽𝛽
3𝑐𝑐
5𝛼𝛼
3𝑐𝑐
𝑔𝑔
𝑟𝑟2
∗
=
+
+
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2
8𝛽𝛽
8
8

Scenario B3: Transmission-Retailer Integration, With Competition
This scenario involves a transmission company monopolist that is integrated one of the
retailers engaged in Betrand product differentiation competition with another retailer. The
𝛼𝛼
3
demand equations for retailer #1 and #2 respectively are 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 = 2 − 2 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 and
𝛼𝛼

3

1

1

𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 = 2 − 2 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 so that 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 = 𝛼𝛼 − 2 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟1 − 2 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 = 𝑄𝑄 when 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 . All
generators operate independently and are engaged in perfect competition.
The profit function for the transmission-retailer company (retailer #1) is:
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) + 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 + 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ),
The profit function for the other retailers #2 is:
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟2 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 )

Since generators compete perfectly such that 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 = 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 + 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 the profit function simplifies to:
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟1 ) + 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ),
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟2 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 ) − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟2 )
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The reaction functions for the two retailers are (note that they are not symmetric):
𝛼𝛼 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 =
+ +
+
+
6𝛽𝛽 2
2
3
3
𝛼𝛼 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 =
+ +
+
+
6𝛽𝛽 2
2
3
2
The retailers’ first order conditions with respect to 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 are:
𝛼𝛼
9𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 3𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 3𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 9𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1 =
+
+
+
+
4𝛽𝛽
16
16
4
16
𝛼𝛼
9𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 3𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 3𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 11𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2 =
+
+
+
+
4𝛽𝛽
16
16
4
16

Retailer #1 choose 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 to maximizes profit by taking the two reaction functions as given so
that:
28𝛼𝛼 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 27𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2 28𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =
−
−
−
57
57
57𝛽𝛽 57
Solving for the equilibrium retail price is:
18𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔
20𝛼𝛼 21𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1 3𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2
∗
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1
=
+
−
+
38
38
38
38𝛽𝛽
47𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔
67𝛼𝛼
27𝑐𝑐
20𝑐𝑐
𝑟𝑟2
𝑟𝑟1
∗
=
+
−
+
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2
114𝛽𝛽
114
114
114

Conclusions
From comparing equilibrium retails prices across the various scenarios, two analytical
conclusions can be made.

First, from comparing the retail price equilibrium across the no competition scenarios,
(Scenario A1, A2, A3), it is clear that:
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 (𝐴𝐴1) = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 (𝐴𝐴2) < 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 (𝐴𝐴3)
because
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔
3𝛼𝛼
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟
3𝛼𝛼
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
5𝛼𝛼
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
∗
∗
∗
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1 = 4𝛽𝛽 + 4 + 4 = 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2 = 4𝛽𝛽 + 4 + 4𝑟𝑟 < 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴3
= 6𝛽𝛽 + 6 + 6𝑟𝑟

when the marginal cost of retail, 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 , and marginal cost of generation, 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 , are sufficiently
small relative to the size of the market, 𝛼𝛼. This assumption seems reasonable in the
electricity industry where fixed capital costs are high and marginal costs are low.
Therefore, when there is vertical integration between a transmission and retail monopolist,
retail prices will likely be higher than the other types of vertical integration.
Second, from comparing the retail price equilibrium across the with competition scenarios,
(Scenario B1, B2, B3), it is clear that:
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 (𝐵𝐵1) = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 (𝐵𝐵2) > 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 (𝐵𝐵3)
because
3𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔
3𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔
18𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔
5𝛼𝛼
3𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟1
5𝛼𝛼
3𝑐𝑐
20𝛼𝛼
21𝑐𝑐
3𝑐𝑐
∗
∗
∗
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1(𝐵𝐵1) = 8𝛽𝛽 + 8 + 8 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1(𝐵𝐵2) = 8𝛽𝛽 + 8𝑟𝑟1 + 8 > 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟1(𝐵𝐵3)
= 38𝛽𝛽 + 38𝑟𝑟1 − 38𝑟𝑟2 + 38
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∗
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2(𝐵𝐵1)

5𝛼𝛼

= 8𝛽𝛽 +

3𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2
8

+

3𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔
8

=

∗
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2(𝐵𝐵2)

and
3𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔
67𝛼𝛼
27𝑐𝑐
20𝑐𝑐
∗
= 8𝛽𝛽 + 8 + 8 >𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟2(𝐵𝐵3)
= 114𝛽𝛽 + 114𝑟𝑟2 − 114𝑟𝑟1 +
5𝛼𝛼

3𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟2

47𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔
114

when the marginal cost of retail, 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 , and marginal cost of generation, 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 , are sufficiently
small relative to the size of the market, 𝛼𝛼. This assumption seems reasonable in the
electricity industry where fixed capital costs are high and marginal costs are low.
Therefore, when there is vertical integration between a transmission monopolist and
retailer with product differentiation, average retail prices will likely be lower than the
other types of vertical integration.
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